Anaconda Plan When war broke out on April 12 1861 the Union had no overall strategy for defeating the Confederacy The commander-in-chief of the U S Army Winfield Scott devised a plan that became known as the Anaconda Plan Scott outlined his strategy in a letter to Major General George B McClellan on May 3 1861 He did not propose an invasion of the South but a campaign to surround and isolate the Confederate states to deprive them of supplies and force a peace deal Naval blockade Part of Scott’s plan was already in action On April 19 President Lincoln had ordered a naval blockade of the major Confederate ports By the end of April the blockade was being established from Norfolk Virginia to Galveston Texas Scott proposed tightening the cordon to shut down the Confederacy’s Atlantic trade Control of the Mississippi Scott also proposed that the Union close off the western part of the Confederacy by gaining control of the Mississippi River This would be achieved by capturing the forts in the Mississippi Delta occupying New Orleans and sending gunboats and an army of 60,000 men down the river from Illinois Mastery of the river would cut off the Confederate states of Texas Arkansas and most of Louisiana from the rest of the South It was a cautious long-term strategy that relied for success on squeezing the South economically The thinking behind the plan Scott decided on his plan for two reasons He had a limited number of men the army he commanded was tiny with only 16,000 professional soldiers or regulars On April 15 Lincoln called on the Union states to recruit Curriculum Context The legality of Lincoln’s decision to order a naval blockade without the initial approval of Congress was later challenged in the Supreme Court Curriculum Context It might be useful to be able to describe the basic elements of the Union plan at the start of the war 6 Battles and Campaigns
75,000 volunteer militia but they were only to serve for three months Scott doubted whether these 90-day men could be relied on to fight a long campaign The government promised an extra 25,000 regulars and 60,000 volunteers to enlist for three years but that was not enough to defeat the Confederacy The other reason for Scott’s strategy was that he hoped to win the South back without destroying it He understood the depth of hatred a civil war would create War fever When the Northern press learned of Scott’s idea they ridiculed its caution dubbing it the Anaconda Plan for a river snake that coils around its prey and squeezes it to death The Anaconda Plan found little favor with Union politicians and army officers eager for a quick victory Scott had foreseen this in his letter to McClellan The greatest obstacle in the way of this plan is the impatience of our patriotic and loyal Union friends They will urge instant and vigorous action regardless I fear of the consequences Scott was right The North was gripped with war fever In May the Confederacy had established its capital in Richmond barely 100 miles 160 km from Washington and a Southern army was forming south of the Potomac at Manassas The North was eager to strike at the Confederacy On to Richmond was the popular cry By June 1861 the Anaconda Plan had been quietly dropped In November Winfield Scott retired from the army and was replaced by his protégé McClellan Scott’s plan to regain the Mississippi River was not rejected entirely The campaign began in February 1862 with the first attack by generals John Pope and Ulysses S Grant and the recapture of New Orleans in April 1862 by naval officer David G Farragut It proved a longer and bloodier business than Scott imagined but played a vital part in the Union’s final victory Enlist To join the military services Curriculum Context War fever in the Union came to an end after the shock of defeat in the First Battle of Bull Run Manassas in July 1861 Anaconda Plan 7
Antietam Sharpsburg Battle of The Battle of Antietam fought at Antietam Creek near Sharpsburg Maryland on September 17 1862 was the climax to Confederate General Robert E Lee’s first invasion of the North It was the bloodiest single day of the Civil War By the end of August 1862 the Army of Northern Virginia was positioned along the Potomac River and had defeated two separate Union armies General Robert E Lee wanted to keep the forward momentum of the army going and saw the chance to take the war into the Union states He could not attack Washington D C because its defenses were too strong but he could invade neighboring Maryland On September 4 the Army of Northern Virginia began crossing the Potomac at Leesburg Moving north into Maryland Lee intended to cross South Mountain and advance on the towns of Boonsboro and Hagerstown However this would leave the Union garrison at Harpers Ferry in a dangerous position behind him On September 9 Lee divided his army sending over half of it under his trusted General Stonewall Jackson west to capture Harpers Ferry General George B McClellan and the Army of the Potomac were by this time advancing north and on September 13 a copy of Lee’s orders fell into Union hands McClellan now knew exactly where the Army of Northern Virginia was and how divided Lee’s position was On the 14th he attacked the Confederates at South Mountain Lee realized that McClellan was advancing between the two halves of his army On the 15th he ordered Jackson back from Harpers Ferry and pulled his own forces toward the Potomac The Confederates would concentrate near Sharpsburg between the Potomac and Antietam Creek Garrison A unit of soldiers guarding a town or other stronghold South Mountain The battle is described on page 89 8 Battles and Campaigns
Lee’s position on September 16 was not promising He had only 18,000 men stretched along a 3-mile 5-km long line on high ground above Sharpsburg with his back to a bend of the Potomac River The far left of the line lay along the Hagerstown Pike about 2 miles 3 2 km north of the village of Sharpsburg at an area called the West East and North Woods His far right lay barely a mile south of the village on the Harpers Ferry road The center was split by the Boonsboro Pike It was an exposed position mostly running through cornfields and fruit orchards with little natural cover Antietam Creek might have offered some defense but it was crossed by three bridges and a number of fords Lee’s only line of retreat was over a single ford across the Potomac Facing Lee was McClellan’s army of more than 75,000 men advancing from the north and east Union attack Fighting began at dusk on September 16 when Joseph Hooker’s Union I Corps began attacking from the north down the Hagerstown Pike toward the North Woods Stonewall Jackson and the first of his units had begun to arrive and by nightfall the Confederates had repulsed Hooker’s advance The following morning at 6 00 A M McClellan began the battle in earnest with an artillery bombardment Hooker’s corps attacked again Ten brigades hit the Confederate left and pushed their line back to the West Woods Jackson counterattacked at 7 00 A M and threw the Union forces back but Hooker received reinforcements from Mansfield’s XII Corps The battle now centered on the struggle for the possession of the Dunker Church which stood in the West Woods Three divisions of Sumner’s II Corps came forward from the Union right to help Mansfield Attacking into the West Woods one of the divisions advanced straight into a line of Confederates and suffered more than Curriculum Context It might be interesting to summarize the strengths and weaknesses of Lee’s position Brigade A military unit consisting of between two and six regiments the brigade was the most common tactical unit of the Civil War Antietam Sharpsburg Battle of 9
